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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030879-CA

v.
PAUL HARRY PEDERSON,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of theft by
receiving stolen property, a third degree felony.

This court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury
about mental states that were not elements of the crime charged?
Whether a trial court erred in refusing to give a requested
jury instruction presents a question of law, reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992);

State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah 1998).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The statute governing theft by receiving stolen property
provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen,
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding the
property from the owner, knowing the property
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner
of it.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of theft by receiving
stolen property, a third degree felony (R. 3-4). A jury
convicted him as charged (R. 59-61, 97). The court sentenced him
to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, consecutive to
other prison commitments (R. 135-36).

Defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal (R. 137).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Anticipating the off-season for his tree service business,
Nathan Haynes stored his stump grinder and trailer in the open
parking lot of another business, chained to the front tire of a
one-ton dump truck (R. 158: 81, 83-84).2

The grinder was

distinctive in several aspects: the front box had been rewelded
1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 52, 999 P.2d 565.
2

The parties stipulated that the equipment was worth
between $2000 and $4000 (R. 158: 102).
-2-

to the frame; the gas tank had been patched; and, most
noticeably, a bright blue rope held a cutting guard up out of the
way to permit the cutting wheel to trim more closely (Id. at 8283).
Towards the end of November 2000, Nathan received a call
from a friend, who had been talking to another tree service
owner, Scott Van Dam (JEd. at 86) . Scott had been looking at a
stump grinder for sale, and Nathan's friend thought it sounded a
lot like Nathan's (Id. at 87). Accordingly, Nathan went to the
parking lot to check on his grinder and trailer.

Both were gone

(Id^).
Nathan got in touch with Scott Van Dam, who directed him to
the general location of the grinder for sale (Id. at 88). As
Nathan walked down a driveway looking for the grinder, he spotted
his trailer out behind a garage.

He immediately recognized it by

modifications he had made to it (Id. at 89-91).

Nathan did not

see his grinder outside and could not see into the garage because
the window was covered (Id. at 92). He went back to his truck
and called the police (Id. at 93).
Nathan had brought two friends, Chris and Tiffany, with him
on this reconnaissance mission (Id. at 96).3 Chris approached
the house adjacent to the garage and knocked on the door (Id. at
3

According to Tiffany, Nathan had little faith in the
police or "in the whole system" (R. 158: 143). He feared the
police might tip defendant off and prevent him from recovering
his equipment (Id.). Hence, he took matters largely into his own
hands.
-3-

110).

Defendant, who had apparently been sleeping, groggily

opened the door (Id. at 110, 121). When Chris inquired about the
grinder for sale, defendant asked how Chris knew about it.
Chris's response, that Scott Van Dam had told him, put defendant
at ease, and he invited Chris inside (Id. at 111).
Defendant closed the door and locked it (Id. at 112).
Defendant told Chris he would show him the grinder and then left
Chris alone while he went to get more fully dressed (Id.).
Chris, frightened to be in the locked home of a suspicious
stranger, unlocked the door and went outside, feigning a need to
smoke (Id. at 112, 118).

Defendant eventually emerged, and the

two discussed a price for the grinder, beginning at $3000 and
eventually working down to around $1000 (Id. at 113).

Chris

testified:
He led me to believe that the stump grinder
belonged to him. He said that he had been
working for a couple of years and [the tree
industry] wasn't doing really good. He
wanted to sell it . . . He was selling the
stump grinder, and he was in control of the
price.
Id. at 113.

Chris later added, "[I]t was crystal clear that

this stump grinder belonged to [defendant]" (Id. at 125).
Somewhere between the front of the house and the garage,
Tiffany joined Chris and defendant (Id. at 114) .4

Defendant led

them over to the garage and unlocked and opened the door,
4

Defendant apparently became nervous and changed his story
when Tiffany began asking him questions. He told her the stump
grinder belonged to "a friend" (R. 158: 114, 126).
-4-

revealing the stump grinder inside (Id.).

Both Chris and Tiffany

immediately recognized it as Nathan's grinder (Id. at 115, 117,
134) .
At this juncture, police began to gather out by the street
(Id. at 135). Defendant, whom Tiffany described as "antsy,"
hurried to close the garage door and suggested that Chris and
Tiffany come back in an hour to consummate the sale (Id. at 13536, 141) .
A police officer then approached and told defendant he would
like to see the grinder and trailer for sale (Id. at 146).
Defendant once again opened the garage door.

The officer, after

verifying ownership of the grinder and trailer, read defendant
his Miranda rights (R. 159 at 147, 217). Thereafter, defendant
told the officer that his friend Wade had asked him to store the
equipment for him at his residence (R. 158 at 147). When
defendant could not or would not supply any further information
about "Wade," the officer arrested him for second degree felony
theft (IcL_ at 148) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on mental states that were not elements of the
crime charged.

Where no persuasive legal authority supports his

contention, his argument fails.

-5-

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ABOUT MENTAL
STATES THAT WERE NOT ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS
CHARGED
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible
error by refusing to give his requested jury instruction defining
mental states that were not elements of the crime with which he
was charged.

Specifically, he urges as error the court's refusal

to instruct the jury that if it found that defendant acted either
recklessly or with criminal negligence, then it must find him not
guilty of theft by receiving stolen property.

See Br. of Aplt.

at 12-13; R. 91-92 or addendum A (disputed jury instruction).
For this proposition, defendant relies wholly on an unpublished
memorandum decision, State v. Meyer, 2001 UT App 297.5

See

addendum B.
Defendant's reliance is misplaced.

Meyer is an affirmative

defense case, holding that a trial court must give a requested
self-defense jury instruction whenever defendant has presented
some reasonable evidentiary basis from which a jury could
conclude that he acted in self-defense, even where he did not
specifically so testify.

Meyer, 2001 UT App 297.

5

Defendant

Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides: "Unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as
all parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at
the time all such decisions are first cited." Utah R. App. P.
30(f); accord Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 516, 44 P.3d
734. Defendant has not complied with this rule.
-6-

seeks to apply the reasoning of Meyer to his own case by urging a
more general rule that, in any case involving a dispute over jury
instructions, the trial court must give a requested jury
instruction as long as defendant has adduced some evidence
relevant to the subject of the disputed instruction.
Aplt. at 14.

See Br. of

Defendant offers no support - nor is there any -

for such a novel rule.
The trial court properly recognized that such an instruction
should not be given.

In rejecting defendant's proposed

instruction in favor of one that defined only the mental states
necessary to convict of the crime charged, the court stated: "I
believe that the instructions [as given] adequately address the
elements, and that as presented [by defendant], the [proposed]
instruction would tend to confuse rather than enlighten the jury"
(R. 159: 266).
The trial court's ruling is correct.

Without question, "the

jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements
that it must find to convict of the crime charged, and the
absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a matter of
law."

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991); accord

State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980).

But nowhere does

the law state that a court is obliged to instruct on elements or
mental states that are not necessary to convict.

Here, defendant

does not dispute that the jury was properly instructed as to the
culpable mental states applicable to the crime charged.

-7-

Thus,

the jury knew that if defendant did not act intentionally or
knowingly, it must acquit.

Telling the jury that it must acquit

if it found defendant acted with a mental state other than
intentional or knowing added nothing to what the jury already
understood it had to find.

Indeed, as the trial court correctly

observed, instructing the jury to consider mental states that
were not relevant would be more likely to confuse the jury than
enlighten it.

Where defendant fails to cite any persuasive legal

authority to support his contention that the court had a legal
duty to instruct the jury on non-culpable mental states, his
argument fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a third degree
felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // '

day of June, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

-8-
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Addendum A

Addendum A

INSTRUCTION NO.

_

One of the elements of the crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is
that the State must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the
property had been stolen or that he believed that it probably had been stolen and
that he intended to deprive the owner of the property thereof.
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a
union or joint operation of the act and the actor's mental state. A person is only
guilty of an offense when his conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with some
kind of criminal intent, that is he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition
of the offense requires.
A person engages in conduct "intentionally," or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts
"knowingly," or "with knowledge," with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Acting "intentionally" or "knowingly" is more than acting "recklessly" or
with "criminal negligence."
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
If you find Paul Harry Pedersen acted "recklessly" or with "criminal
negligence," but not "intentionally" or "knowingly," you must find him NOT
GUILTY.

2

on

Addendum B

Addendum B

Not Reported in P.2d
2001 UTApp 297
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1205307 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
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COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tina Caywood MEYER, Defendant and Appellant.

question of law, which we review for correctness.' "
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 31 P.3d
557, 2001 UT 77, If 38, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). We
recently stated that " ' "[f]ailure to give requested
jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if
their omission tends to mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently
or erroneously advises the jury on the law." ' " State
v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, \ 17, 17 P.3d 1153
(citation omitted).

No. 20000895-CA.
Oct. 12,2001.
Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for appellant.
Before JACKSON, BENCH, and ORME, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge.
*1 Tina Caywood Meyer appeals her conviction of
Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999). Meyer argues only that the
trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction on
self-defense. [FN1] The State did not file a
responsive brief nor challenge Meyer's assertions by
letter, memorandum, or otherwise, nor in anyway
suggest that Meyer is not entitled to relief. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
FN1. Self-defense can be asserted when
the defendant "reasonably believe[d] that
force [was] necessary to defend him[- or
her]self or a third person against such
other's imminent use of unlawful force."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999).

" 'Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a
proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a

Here, Jenni Monteath testified that Meyer "grabbed
[Monteath's] hair on both sides" and hit Monteath
ten or twelve times with a closed fist. On the other
hand, Meyer's husband testified that Monteath
"came out and grabbed [Meyer] by the head."
Meyer herself, testified that Monteath "pulled
[Meyer] over into the side of the apartment" and
began "scratching and clawing at [Meyer's] face."
Meyer also testified that she never hit back and that
her main "concern was pretty much just trying to get
out of the situation."
A jury instruction on self-defense must be given
"when the defendant has presented sufficient
evidence that [the defendant's] assertion of
self-defense rises to a conscious level in the minds
of jurors." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, If 8,
18 P.3d 1123. "We are not concerned with the
reasonableness, nor the credibility of the defendant's
evidence relating to his [or her] claim of
self-defense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1980). We only decide whether "there is a
basis in the evidence ... which would provide some
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude" that
Meyer acted in self-defense. State v. Knoll, 111
P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985).
While Meyer did not testify that she was acting in
self-defense, she requested a jury instruction
regarding self-defense. Further, although the
testimony at trial conflicted, "there is a basis in the
evidence ... which would provide some reasonable
basis for the jury to conclude" that Meyer acted in
self- defense. Id. Thus, we conclude that the
evidence presented justifies an instruction on

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Not Reported in P.2d
2001 UTApp 297
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1205307 (Utah App.))

Page 2

self-defense. See Torres, 619 P.2d at 695. Omitting
the jury instruction " ' "insufficiently ... advise[d]
the jury on the law," » " Stringham, 17 P.3d 1153,
2001 UT App 13 at <h 17 (citation omitted),
because it did not allow the jury to consider
alternate theories presented at trial. Accordingly,
the trial court's refusal to give the self-defense
instruction was reversible error.
*2 The court stated that it refused to give the
instruction because "self- defense [didn't] fit" with
Meyer's testimony that any touching she did was
incidental or accidental. The court agreed not to
give the self-defense instruction if the prosecution
would not argue that Meyer recklessly caused the
injury because Meyer's statement that she just
wanted to get out of the situation was "a valid
defense too," and self-defense was inconsistent with
Meyer's theory. However, Meyer also testified that
(1) her "concern was pretty much to get out o f the
situation; (2) she "had one hand in [Monteath's]
hair, pulling [Monteath's] hair, because [Monteath]
had her hand pulling" Meyer's hair; and (3) she put
her "hand down on [Monteath's] forehead to push
[her]self up." Further, both Meyer and Meyer's
husband testified that Monteath was the aggressor.
Thus, Meyer's testimony included assertions that
she had used force to extract herself from a situation
where Monteath was the aggressor. Although Meyer
testified that any touching was incidental or
accidental, other testimony on the record is
consistent with self-defense.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
We concur: RUSSELL
GREGORY K. ORME, JJ.

W.

BENCH

and

2001 WL 1205307 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 297
END OF DOCUMENT
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